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In the last decade, blockchain has emerged as one of the most influential innovations in software architecture 
and technology. Ideally, blockchains are designed to be architecturally and politically decentralized, similar 
to the Internet. But recently, public and permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum have faced 
stumbling blocks in the form of scalability. Both Bitcoin and Ethereum process fewer than 20 transactions 
per second, which is significantly lower than their centralized counterpart such as VISA that can process 
approximately 1,700 transactions per second. In realizing this hindrance in the wide range adoption of 
blockchains for building advanced and large scalable systems, the blockchain community has proposed first- 
and second-layer scaling solutions including Segregated Witness (Segwit), Sharding, and two-way pegged 
sidechains. Although these proposals are innovative, they still suffer from the blockchain trilemma of 
scalability, security, and decentralization. Moreover, at this time, little is known or discussed regarding 
factors related to design choices, feasibility, limitations and other issues in adopting the various first- and 
second-layer scaling solutions in public and permissionless blockchains. Hence, this thesis provides the first 
comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art first- and second-layer scaling solutions for public and 
permissionless blockchains, identifying current advancements and analyzing their impact from various 
viewpoints, highlighting their limitations and discussing possible remedies for the overall improvement of 
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In the last decade, blockchain has emerged as one of the most influential innovations in software 
architecture and technology. Ideally, public blockchains (such as Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008) and 
Ethereum (Wood, 2014)) are designed to be architecturally and politically decentralized (Robinson, 
2018), similar to the Internet. They enable trusted transactions among several untrusted participants 
on a network without a need for a trusted central authority or a third party. As a result of this, 
blockchains are now employed in various computing and business domains such as cloud 
computing, supply-chains, Internet of Things (IoT), finance, and many others (Miller, 2018), 
(Fiaidhi, Mohammed, & Mohammed, 2018), (Zhou, Wang, Sun, & Lv, 2018), (Mylrea & 
Gourisetti, 2018). Alongside its industrial counterpart, academic research in the domain is also 
increasing rapidly, especially in applying blockchain technology for developing decentralized 
solutions and applications (S. Yu et al., 2018), (Lou, Zhang, Qi, & Lei, 2018), (Kan et al., 2018), 
(Robinson, 2018). Additionally, research in recognizing technical challenges in the blockchain 
domain (Reza M Parizi, Amritraj, & Dehghantanha, 2018), (Atzei, Bartoletti, & Cimoli, 2017), 
(Giaglis et al., 2017) has also been growing steadily in the recent years along with studies that 
provide possible solutions to these challenges including, formal verification of smart contracts 
(Bhargavan et al., 2016), (Amani, Bégel, Bortin, & Staples, 2018), (Abdellatif & Brousmiche, 
2018), scalability improvement of blockchains (Dennis, Owenson, & Aziz, 2016) and defining 
atomic cross-chain swap protocols (Herlihy, 2018). 
 
 
1.1 The Problem 
 
This growth in interest from both the enterprise and research communities in blockchain related 
technologies has seen a major stumbling block in recent years in the form of scalability, which has 
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quickly become the core problem surrounding blockchains. Scalability of a system or network is 
defined as its capacity to grow in size and manage increased demand from its user-base (Duboc, 
Rosenblum, & Wicks, 2006). In other words, scalable systems can be efficiently enlarged to 
accommodate increased usage and activity from their user-base.  
State-of-the-art blockchains are hindered by scalability due to the following two reasons: 
1) There are limits on the number of transactions that a blockchain network can process and 2) 
blockchains are designed to provide solutions to a specific problem, they often tend to be vanilla in 
nature and hence, generally lack many features that traditional state-of-the-art centralized systems 
offer out of the box. For instance, a centralized database system can be built to provide several 
functionalities at once such as supply chain tracking, financial payments, and remote shopping, 
whereas on the other hand, a blockchain such as Bitcoin is built to provide only one functionality, 
i.e. to facilitate trustless peer-to-peer financial transactions within its network. Hence, it cannot 
store supply-chain information or provide the comforts of remote shopping to a user on its network 
by itself. In fact, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to implement a universal blockchain that 








State-of-the-art blockchains face a trilemma of scalability, security, and decentralization (Figure 
1). Blockchains can only have two of these three attributes: 
• Scalability concerns with the ability of a blockchain to process transactions in bulk. If 
public blockchains are to become mainstream, then they need to be able to handle the 
scenario in which there are millions of users on the network. 
• Security is concerned with the immutability of the blockchain and its robustness to attacks 
such as Sybil (Douceur, 2002), Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) (Feinstein, 
Schnackenberg, Balupari, & Kindred, 2003) and 51% attacks1. 
• Decentralization is the core tenant upon which the blockchain community is built upon 
which provides censorship resistance and allows any user to participate in a decentralized 
environment without prejudice.  
Public and permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum were designed around 
decentralization and security as core features. However, this came at an expense of scalability as 
both Bitcoin and Ethereum have extremely low throughput when it comes to transaction processing 
rates. For instance, Bitcoin can only process approximately 7 transactions per second 2  and 
Ethereum can process approximately 15 transactions per second 3 . When compared to their 
centralized counterparts such as VISA which can process approximately 1,700 transactions per 












1.2 Solutions Proposed by the Community 
 
Realizing this hindrance in the growth and further adoption of blockchains for building advanced 
and complicated software systems, both the research and enterprise communities have proposed 
first- and second-layer scaling solutions for blockchains.  
 
1.2.1 First-layer Scaling Solutions 
 
First-layer scaling solutions are the ones that require changes to the source code of a blockchain 
(Dolce, 2018). These solutions propose enhancements to the core characteristics and features of a 
blockchain. Some examples of first layer solutions include increasing the block size limit of Bitcoin 
from 1MB to 10 MB or reducing the block creation time from 10 minutes to 5 minutes. Some other 
ways in which first layer scaling solutions could be implemented are as follows: 
 
• Segregated witness: Segregated Witness (Dolce, 2018) is a proposed first-layer scaling 
solution for the Bitcoin protocol that changes the way data is stored on the Bitcoin 
blockchain. The proposal is to remove the signature data from each transaction of a block 
to free up space for more transactions to be included in Bitcoin’s current 1 Megabyte block 
size. In its current implementation the signature data in Bitcoin takes up almost 70% of the 
block space which leaves behind little space for transactions. Therefore, removing it would 
save tremendous space that allows more transactions to be included in the block.  
 
• Sharding: Sharding (Dolce, 2018) proposes the breaking down or dividing blockchains 
into smaller manageable parts called shards, that run simultaneous (parallel) to one 
another. Each shard is in-charge of processing transactions within the group, thereby 
increasing processing output across the board. Fragmenting the network into many 
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different small parts allow the Ethereum blockchain to function as the sum of its parts, 
rather than being limited by the speed of each individual node.  
 
1.2.2 Second-layer Scaling Solutions 
 
Second-layer scaling solutions are the ones that propose the implementation of secondary protocols 
on top a pre-existing primary blockchain called the primary chain or the mainchain (Dolce, 2018). 
This reduces network congestion and saves space as the transactions are off-loaded onto the 
secondary protocols.  Second-layer solutions involve the proposal of sidechains: 
• Sidechains: are secondary blockchains which are connected to other blockchains by means 
of a two-way peg. A two-way peg is a mechanism that allows the bidirectional transfer of 
assets between the main chain and the sidechain at a fixed or pre-deterministic exchange 
rate. Sidechains may have their own protocol and implementation which can be completely 
different from the main blockchain. Such adjustability provides users of a network with the 
flexibility to access various other functionalities and features offered on a sidechain by 
using the assets they already own on the main blockchain. Furthermore, sidechains are 
isolated from the main blockchain in such a way that in the case of a cryptographic break 




1.3 Contributions of this Work 
 
 
Although promising, the existing scaling solutions are still in the state of infancy and to this date, 
little is known or discussed regarding factors related to design choices, feasibility, limitations and 
other issues in adopting these scaling solutions. Moreover, there is a lack of comparative and 
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empirical studies both in academic and industrial environments to analyze such protocols and multi-
blockchain systems in a comprehensive manner. Hence, the motivation of this research is to provide 
the first comprehensive analysis of the first- and second-layer scaling solutions for public and 
permissionless blockchains to understand the design choices, advancements, use cases, and 
limitations of such solutions. The specific contributions of this research are as follows:  
• Provide a thorough analysis of first and second-layer blockchain scaling solutions. 
• Analyze the most common design choices for these scaling solutions by highlighting their 
advantages and disadvantages  
• Provide a comprehensive review of current state-of-the-art scalability enhancing platforms 
based on their use cases, consensus mechanisms, asset transfer protocol and limitations 
with horizontal comparison  
• Provide an overview of new and upcoming innovative scaling solutions and frameworks  
• Identify open issues and discuss possible solutions to mitigate those issues with state-of-
the-art blockchain scaling solutions  
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 describes the research protocol and 
methodology used and the research questions answered by this work. Chapter 3 investigates the 
first layer scaling solutions and answers the research questions raised for such proposals. Chapter 
4 discusses the second layer scaling solutions and answers the research questions raised for such 
solutions. Chapter 5 sheds light on open issues and limitations while proposing future directions 
and possible solutions to mitigate these issues and limitations. Finally, Chapter 6 provides the 








In this work, we analyze the state-of-the-art first- and second-layer scaling solutions and platforms 
proposed for improving the scalability of public and permissionless blockchains including Bitcoin 
and Ethereum. For this work, we adopted an Systematic Literature Review (SLR) based 
information and data gathering approach which helped us in identification, evaluation and 
interpretation of all available research, solutions or platforms relevant to one or more research 
questions which are mentioned below (Kitchenham, 2004), (Kitchenham & Charters, 2007).  Based 
on these research questions (RQs) (see section 2.2) we designed a custom data gathering protocol 
for the identification of relevant resources and platforms for this research.  
 
2.1 Research Protocol 
 
An important characteristic of every research work is the identification of a problem and a protocol 




Figure 2: Thesis Protocol 
 
It can be seen from the figure that our work started with the identification of a problem (in this 
case, scalability of public and permissionless blockchains), which led us into raising research 
questions regarding the state-of-the-art solutions. We then collected, filtered and expanded our 
inclusion criteria to include all relevant research resources and proceeded to answer the raised 
research questions which allowed us to identify open issues and ultimately, propose initial steps to 
solve or mitigate these issues. In the following sections of this chapter, we will enlist the research 





2.2 Research Questions (RQs) 
 
The most compelling motivation behind this research is to answer the following research questions 
(RQs) based on the proposed first- and second-layer scaling solutions and platforms. 
2.2.1 First Layer Scaling Solutions Research Questions (RQs) 
 
• RQ1: What are the Design Choices available for implementing first layer scaling 
solutions? 
• RQ2: What are the limitations of these designs? 
• RQ3: What are the problems associated with implementing First Layer scalability 
solutions in public blockchains? 
 
2.2.2 Second Layer Scaling Solutions Research Questions (RQs) 
 
• RQ1: What are the available design choices for implementing two-way pegs? 
• RQ2: What are the advantages and limitations of these design choices? 
• RQ3: Which state-of-the-art platforms are implementing sidechains? 
➢ RQ3a: What are the use cases of these platforms? 
➢ RQ3b: How does asset transfer take place on these platforms? 
➢ RQ3c: What consensus mechanism do these platforms utilize? 
➢ RQ3d: How do these platforms impact the scalability of their mainchain? 
➢ RQ3e: What are the limitations of these platforms? 
To answer these questions, we designed a custom protocol to search and identify all relevant 
resources such as journal articles, conference papers, workshop articles, etc. in the realms of 
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blockchain scalability. In the subsequent sections, we describe the various steps that we performed 
for filtering the relevant resources to accurately answer the research questions in this section. 
 
2.3 Search Strategy 
 
Once we determined the digital libraries and search engines to be used for gathering relevant 
resources, we constructed several search terms to be used on these libraries and search engines 
based on our research questions. Some examples of our search terms are mentioned in Table 1. 
Table 1: Search string and terms 
 
Terms 
Blockchain, Scalability, Sharding, Segregated witness, 




Ethereum Sharding, Bitcoin scalability, Blockchain 








Next, we performed manual searches with several combinations of search terms on digital libraries 
and search engines such as Google, Duck-Duck Go and Yahoo which yielded the results as shown 
in Figure 2. This provided us with the unfiltered preliminary set of works on blockchain scalability. 
 
2.4 Preliminary set of works 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, we conducted manual searches based on search terms and 
keywords on several identified digital libraries and search engines to identify and collect the 
preliminary set of works. The results from these searches are summarized in Figure 2, which shows 
the total number of preliminary studies acquired from each database and search engine. We 
obtained a total of 2136 preliminary studies from our search. These studies were carefully chosen 
based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria mentioned in Table 2. 
Table 2: Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria for relevant works 
 
Inclusion Criteria Exclusion criteria 
Be published online digital databases such as 
IEEE, ACM Digital Library, SpringerLink, etc. 
Resources not published in English 
Studies are in the domain of blockchain 
scalability 
Resources from unreliable online sources 
Studies offer technical quality in the 
presentation of ideas and reviews 
Studies with poor presentation quality 
Studies used current technical quality aspects Grey literature, studies with incomplete 
ideas and poor explanation of concepts  
 
Out of these 2136 studies, only 1047 were from online digital databases namely ScienceDirect, 
IEEE Xplore, ACM Digital Library, SpringerLink, John Wiley, Taylor and Forensic, Word 
Scientific and Google Scholar. The remaining 1089 resources were from search engine results such 
as Google, Yahoo and Duck-Duck Go. It is important to mention at this time the results obtained 
in the search engines were considerably larger than just 1089 studies but, most of these results 
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covered repetitive topics or were not from trustworthy sources. Hence, after we collected the 2136 
preliminary set of works, we started the initial filtering phase where, the collected studies were 
carefully removed based on duplicate removal, title filtering, and abstract filtering. The studies 
remaining after each filtering stage is shown in Figure 2. 
Table 3: Search results from digital databases 
Digital 
Database 
Year Article Name Reference 
arxiv 2018 Requirements for private Ethereum Sidechains 
(Robinson, 
2018) 
IEEE 2018 The Blockchain for Domain Based Static Sharding 
(Yoo, Yim, & 
Kim, 2018) 
IEEE 2018 
A Scale-Out Blockchain for Value Transfer with 
Spontaneous Sharding 
(Ren et al., 
2018) 
IEEE 2018 
OmniLedger: A Secure, Scale-Out, Decentralized 
Ledger via Sharding 
(Kokoris-
Kogias et al., 
2018) 
IEEE 2018 A Scalable and Extensible Blockchain Architecture 
(Y. Yu, Liang, 
& Xu, 2018) 












A Prototype Evaluation of a Tamper-Resistant 
High Performance Blockchain-Based Transaction 
Log for a Distributed Database 
(Aniello et al., 
2017) 
IEEE 2018 
Chameleon: A Scalable and Adaptive Permissioned 
Blockchain Architecture 
(He, Su, & 
Gao, 2018) 






ProductChain: Scalable Blockchain Framework to 






2016 A Secure Sharding Protocol For Open Blockchains 

































Bringing Secure Bitcoin Transactions to Your 
Smartphone 
(Frey et al., 
2016) 
SpringerLink 2018 Pruneable sharding-based blockchain protocol 
(Feng et al., 
2018) 
SpringerLink 2017 






A Decentralized Sharding Service Network 
Framework with Scalability 
(Cai, Yang, & 
Ming, 2018) 




The initial filtering stages reduced the relevant works to just 20 studies. These studies are shown in 
Table 3. The next step in the filtering process was content filtering, where we removed studies with 
irrelevant content in regard to this research by carefully and thoroughly reading each of the 20 
studies. This process further reduced the relevant studies into single digits. This research focuses 
on public and permissionless blockchain such as Ethereum and Bitcoin’s scalability and most of 
the 20 preliminary studies fell out of the scope of this study as they focus on the scalability of 
private or permissioned blockchains. 
At this stage, we were forced to turn our attention towards the enterprise blockchain 
community and other online resources published by credible sources and individuals such as 
CoinDesk, Vitalik Buterin, and other well-established platforms such as the Lightening Network5 
for Bitcoin, etc. Hence, we have answered our research questions based on the results of our 
thorough investigation and analysis of both resources from online digital databases and other 




credible technical sources including but not limited to white papers, conference presentations, 








First layer scaling solutions are referred to as the scaling solutions that require changes to be made 
onto the codebase of the blockchain. This entails enhancing the core features and characteristics of 
the blockchain. Some examples of first layer solutions include increasing the block size limit of 
Bitcoin from 1MB to 10 MB or reducing the block creation time from 10 minutes to 5 minutes. 
In this chapter, we are going to discuss the two major First layer scaling solutions 1) 
Segregated Witness, as proposed for the Bitcoin blockchain and 2) Sharding, which is proposed for 
the Ethereum blockchain. 
 
3.1 Segregated Witness  
 
Segregated witness is a protocol upgrade for Bitcoin that changes the way and structure of how 
data is stored. By removing the signature data for each transaction, it frees up more space and 
capacity for more transactions to be stored in Bitcoin’s 1MB-capacity blocks. The signature data – 
the digital signature that verifies the ownership and availability of the sender’s funds – make up 
almost 70% of the entire space of a transaction. Therefore, removing it would save tremendous 
space that allows more transactions to be included in the block (Dolce, 2018).  
 
3.2 Sharding  
 
At the time of writing this thesis, Ethereum, the most prominent smart contract platform in the 
world, can only process approximately 15 transactions per second. This severe limitation, coupled 
with the popularity of the platform, leads to high gas prices (the cost of executing a transaction on 
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the network) and long confirmation times. Although a new block is added every 10-20 seconds on 
Ethereum blockchain, the average time for a transaction to be added on to the blockchain is over 1 
minute, according to ETH Gas Station6. Thus, low throughput, high gas prices, and high latency 
have rendered Ethereum unsuitable for building scalable services and applications.  
Ethereum’s low throughput is based on the fact that each node on the network has to 
process each transaction that occurs on the platform. To address this limitation, the blockchain 
community has proposed a few solutions which target the Ethereum protocol.  Most of these 
solutions introduce central entities to process transactions at a high frequency. This is usually done 
by delegating all the computation to a small subset of powerful nodes. For instance, Thunder7 runs 
a single node to process all transactions and claims to achieve approximately 1200 transaction per 
second which is 100 times faster than current Ethereum capabilities. Other examples of such 
solutions are Algorand 8 , SpaceMesh 9 , and Solana 10  who are all attempting to improve the 
consensus protocols and design of blockchains to process high volumes of transactions each 
second. In addition to decentralization, another limitation of these solutions is that they are all 
bounded by the processing capabilities of a single node and hence, are vulnerable to a complete 
shutdown in case of power failures, natural disasters, etc.  
In contrast, the other proposed solution, Blockchain sharding, delegates work such that, 
each node on the network only performs a subset of the total amount of work in processing a 
transaction on the blockchain. Sharding is the solution being used by the Ethereum foundation for 
improving the scalability of the Ethereum platform. 
The concept of sharding in the domain blockchains comes from the world of databases 
where it is used to make servers and databases more efficient. This is done by storing each shard 








which a horizontal chunk of a database on a separate server instance consequently, spreading the 
load on the server. 
In blockchains, the idea is to have each node store only a part of the blockchain (called a 
shard in this context), instead of the entire blockchain itself. This means that a node that stores a 
shard only maintains information on that shard in a shared manner, thus, maintain decentralization. 
However, each node doesn’t load the information on the entire blockchain, thus helping in 
scalability. 
Proof of Work (PoW)11 consensus algorithm cannot be used in conjunction with sharding, 
this is because all participant nodes cannot be involved in transaction validation as each node only 
has information regarding a particular shard i.e. the shard it belongs to. Thus, the ideas that have 
been proposed for blockchain sharding are based on consensus mechanisms like Proof of Stake 
(PoS)12. 
In Proof of Stake consensus mechanism transaction validation responsibilities are 
undertaken by specific designated nodes called “stakers”. Stakers are required to stake their digital 
assets such as tokens to participate in transaction validation. A staker earns a part or the entirety of 
the transaction fees upon transaction validation. The number of transaction validations allowed for 
a staker is directly proportional to the amount and duration of their assets on stake. Additionally, 
the Proof of Stake consensus mechanism provides the following advantages over the Proof of 
Work: 
• A subset of all nodes validates each transaction instead of the entire network nodes. 
• Absence of mining eliminates the requirement for expensive special-purpose, high-
performance hardware including CPUs, GPUs, and SSDs. This consequently decreases the 
energy costs. 





• It is easy to identify loyal and honest validators based on the amount and duration of the 
digital assets staked. 
Each shard in a sharded blockchain identifies stakers who assume the transaction validation 
responsibilities for that shard. Since transaction validation is done by honest and loyal stakers, it is 
easy to presume that the security of the blockchain is still well preserved when compared to 
blockchains with Proof of Work mechanisms. 
 
3.3 Answers to Research Questions (RQs)  
 
In this section, we answer the research questions for first-layer scaling solutions raised in Chapter 
2 to discuss the design choices for implementing such solutions, their impact on scalability and 
limitations. Finally, we will discuss the challenges associated with implementing first-layer scaling 
solutions in public blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. 
 
3.3.1 RQ1: What are the Design Choices available for implementing first-layer scaling 
solutions? 
 
To answer this research question, we will discuss multiple ways in which first layer scaling 
solutions can be implemented. We begin the discussion with a thorough look into the design of 
segregated witness: 
3.3.1.1 Segregated Witness Design 
 
To analyze the idea behind segregated witness, we need to first explain how a current transaction 
takes place on the Bitcoin network. This would allow us to demonstrate the potential impact of 




Figure 4: Non-segwit transaction 
 
As shown in Figure 4, with non-Segwit transactions, the signatures needed to unlock the inputs are 
included along with the rest of the transaction data in the hash to get the transaction ID (TXID) 
(McManus, 2017). Non-segwit transactions include the signatures in the hash to get the TXID. 







Figure 5: Segwit Transaction 
 
On the other hand, as can be seen in Figure 5, with Segwit transactions, we have two fundamental 
changes. Segwit transactions do not hash the signature data. Signature data is stored as “witness” 
data in the block. 
• The signature data is not included in the hash to form the TXID. Signatures are still stored 
in the block with the transactions as part of “witness” data, but they are longer included in 
the TXID hash. 
• The block size limit is changed from 1MB (1,000,000 bytes) to a 4,000,000 “weight” limit, 
an arbitrary new metric. A normal byte in a transaction has a weight of 4 while a witness 
byte has a weight of 1. 





3.3.1.1.1 Transaction Malleability 
 
With Bitcoin transactions before Segwit, there was a bug in the software called “transaction 
malleability”. As we know by now, the TXID pre-Segwit is the result of hashing the transaction 
data including the signatures. Although there were checks and balances to ensure that the inputs 
and outputs couldn’t be changed (i.e. the parties in a transaction and the amounts of Bitcoin being 
sent), the signature used to unlock the inputs could be modified slightly (such that it was still a 
valid signature) but would completely change the TXID when hashed. With the signature no longer 
a part of the TXID in Segwit, transaction malleability is no longer a problem. 
3.3.1.1.2 Increased Block Capacity 
 
By changing the block size limit from a byte’s limit to a new 4,000,000 weight limit, the number 
of transactions allowed in each block can be increased while maintaining backward compatibility 
with the existing cap of 1MB per block. How? Simple math. Our equation for Segwit nodes is as 
follows: 
4 ∗ 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 + (1 ∗ 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒) = 4,000,000 
Non-Segwit nodes in the network will not be able to see the witness data, making their equation: 
4 ∗ 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 = 4,000,000 
𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 = 1,000,000 
So, with Segwit, we’ll never go over the 1MB block size limit on older nodes, making this backward 
compatible. Only Segwit nodes will be able to see the signature data, but existing nodes will still 
have access to all the transactions. 
Segwit won’t bring about nodes with a block size of 4MB though as blocks aren’t 
comprised 100% of witness bytes. The actual size of the blocks will depend on the adoption rate of 
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Segwit, although the expected average block size will be around 1.7–2MB based on tests showing 
around 60% of a transaction to be witness data. 
 
3.3.1.2 Sharding Design Choices 
 
Now, we will discuss the various design choices for implementing sharding that has been proposed 
by the blockchain community: 
3.3.1.2.1 Scaling by Thousand Altcoins 
 
The co-founder of the Ethereum platform, Vitalik Buterin, introduced the concept of “Scaling by a 
thousand Altcoins” in his presentation (Buterin, 2017). This design proposes the use of multiple 
blockchains instead of a single blockchain. Each blockchain in this multi-blockchain environment 
consists of its own set of validators and is known as a shard. For the rest of this discussion, we use 
a generic term “validator” to refer to participants or entities that validate transactions and produce 
new blocks, with the help of a suitable consensus mechanism such as mining with Proof of Work, 
or via a voting-based mechanism. For now, let’s assume that the shards never communicate with 
each other. Although this design is simple, it is sufficient to highlight some of the major challenges 
in sharding. 
 
3.3.1.2.1.1 Validator partitioning and Beacon chains 
 
The first challenge is the weakening of security of each shard as having their own validator makes 
them several magnitudes insecure than the entire chain. So, if a non-sharded chain with X validators 
decides to hard-fork into a sharded blockchain, and splits X validators across 10 shards, each shard 
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now only has X/10 validators, and corrupting one shard only requires corrupting (51/10) % or 5.1% 
of the total number of validators as can be seen from Figure 6. 
This paves the way for the second challenge: Who selects the validators for each shard? 
Controlling 5.1% of validators is only damaging if all 5.1% of the validators are in the same shard. 
If validators can’t choose which shard they get to validate in, a participant controlling 5.1% of the 
validators is highly unlikely to get all their validators in the same shard, heavily reducing their 
ability to compromise the system (Skidanov, 2018b). 
 
Figure 6: Validator ability to corrupt a shard 
 
Almost all sharding designs today rely on some source of randomness to assign validators to shards. 
Randomness on the blockchain is a challenging topic in itself and requires more research in the 
future, but for now, let’s assume there’s some source of randomness we can use. 
Both the randomness and the validators assignment require computation that is not specific 
to any particular shard. For that computation, practically all existing designs have a separate 
blockchain that is tasked with performing operations necessary for the maintenance of the entire 
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network. Besides generating random numbers and assigning validators to the shards, these 
operations often also include receiving updates from shards and taking snapshots of them, 
processing stakes and slashing in Proof-of-Stake systems, and rebalancing shards when that feature 
is supported. Such chain is called a Beacon chain in Ethereum. 
 
3.3.1.2.2 Quadratic Sharding 
 
Sharding is often advertised as a solution that scales infinitely with the number of nodes 
participating in the network operation. While it is in theory possible to design such a sharding 
solution, any solution that has the concept of a Beacon chain doesn’t have infinite scalability. To 
understand why, note that the Beacon chain has to do some bookkeeping computation, such as 
assigning validators to shards, or snapshotting shard chain blocks, that is proportional to the number 
of shards in the system. Since the Beacon chain is itself a single blockchain, with computation 
bounded by the computational capabilities of nodes operating it, the number of shards is naturally 
limited. 
However, the structure of a sharded network does bestow a multiplicative effect on any 
improvements to its nodes. Consider the case in which an arbitrary improvement is made to the 
efficiency of nodes in the network which will allow them faster transaction processing times. 
If the nodes operating the network, including the nodes in the Beacon chain, become four 
times faster, then each shard will be able to process four times more transactions, and the Beacon 
chain will be able to maintain 4 times more shards. The throughput across the system will increase 
by the factor of 4 x 4 = 16, thus, the name quadratic sharding. 
It is hard to provide an accurate measurement for how many shards are viable today, but it 
is unlikely that in any foreseeable future the throughput needs of blockchain users will outgrow the 
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limitations of quadratic sharding. The sheer number of nodes necessary to operate such a volume 
of shards securely is orders of magnitude higher than the number of nodes operating all the 
blockchains combined today. 
 
3.3.1.2.3 State Sharding 
 
Up until now, we haven’t defined very well what exactly is and is not separated when a network is 
divided into shards. Specifically, nodes in the blockchain perform three important tasks: not only 
do they 1) process transactions, but they also 2) relay validated transactions and completed blocks 
to other nodes and 3) store the state and the history of the entire network ledger. Each of these three 
tasks imposes a growing requirement on the nodes operating the network: 
• The necessity to process transactions requires more compute power with the increased 
number of transactions being processed; 
• The necessity to relay transactions and blocks requires more network bandwidth with the 
increased number of transactions being relayed; 
• The necessity to store data requires more storage as the state grows. Importantly, unlike 
the processing power and network, the storage requirement grows even if the transaction 
rate (number of transactions processed per second) remains constant. 
From the above list, it might appear that the storage requirement would be the most pressing 
since it is the only one that is being increased over time even if the number of transactions per 
second doesn’t change, but in practice, the most pressing requirement today is the compute power. 
The entire state of Ethereum as of this writing is 100GB, easily manageable by most of the nodes. 
But the number of transactions Ethereum can process is around 20, orders of magnitude less than 
what is needed for many practical use cases. 
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Practically, under State sharding, the nodes in each shard build their own blockchain that 
contains transactions that affect only the local part of the global state that is assigned to that shard. 
Therefore, the validators in the shard only need to store their local part of the global state and only 
execute, and as such only relay, transactions that affect their part of the state. This partition linearly 
reduces the requirement on all compute power, storage, and network bandwidth, but introduces 
new problems, which will be discussed in RQ2. 
 
3.3.2 RQ2: What are the limitations of these designs? 
 
We will now discuss some of the limitations and challenges that arise based on the designs of 
segregated witness and sharding: 
3.3.2.1 Segregated Witness Limitations 
 
Some of the risks associated with Segregated witness are as follows: 
• Miners would get lower transaction fees for each transaction. 
• Segwit implementation is complex and it requires that all the wallets implement segwit 
themselves. 
• Segwit would significantly increase the amount of resources required to maintain the 
network since, the network capacity, transactions, bandwidth would increase. 
• It might result in a hard fork of the Bitcoin network which may ultimately, decrease the 
financial value of both the networks. 
• Finally, Segwit would be difficult to maintain. The sidechain containing the signature data 
will need to be maintained by miners as well. However, unlike the main blockchain, the 
miners have no financial benefits on doing so. Hence, some sort of reward protocol needs 




3.3.2.2 Sharding Limitations 
 
There are three main issues that arise with the proposed sharding solutions. We will assess these 
limitations in detail in this section: 
 
3.3.2.2.1 Cross-shard transactions 
 
“Scaling by a thousand Altcoin” as a model is not a very useful approach to sharding, because if 
individual shards cannot communicate with each other, they are no better than multiple independent 
blockchains. Even today, when sharding is not available, there’s a huge demand for interoperability 
between various blockchains. 
Let’s for now only consider simple payment transactions, where each participant has an 
account on exactly one shard. If one wishes to transfer money from one account to another within 
the same shard, the transaction can be processed entirely by the validators in that shard. If, however, 
Alice that resides on shard 1 wants to send money to Bob who resides on shard 2, neither validators 
on shard 1(they won’t be able to credit Bob’s account) nor the validators on shard 2 (they won’t be 
able to debit Alice’s account) can process the entire transaction. There are two families of 
approaches to cross-shard transactions: 
• Synchronous: whenever a cross-shard transaction needs to be executed, the blocks in 
multiple shards that contain state transition related to the transaction get all produced at the 
same time, and the validators of multiple shards collaborate on executing such transactions. 
• Asynchronous: a cross-shard transaction that affects multiple shards is executed in those 
shards asynchronously, the “Credit” shard executing its half once it has sufficient evidence 
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that the “Debit” shard has executed its portion. This system is today proposed in Cosmos13, 
Ethereum Serenity14, Near15, Kadena16, and others. A problem with this approach lies in 
that if blocks are produced independently, there’s a non-zero chance that one of the 
multiple blocks will be orphaned, thus making the transaction only partially applied. 
Consider Figure 7 below that depicts two shards both of which encountered a fork, and a 
cross-shard transaction that was recorded in blocks A and X’ correspondingly. If the chains 
A-B and V’-X’-Y’-Z’ end up being canonical in the corresponding shards, the transaction 
is fully finalized. If A’-B’-C’-D’ and V-X become canonical, then the transaction is fully 
abandoned, which is acceptable. But if, for example, A-B and V-X become canonical, then 




Figure 7: Cross-shard transactions 








Note that communication between chains is useful outside of sharded blockchains too. 
Interoperability between chains is a complex problem that many projects are trying to solve. In 
sharded blockchains, the problem is somewhat easier since the block structure and consensus are 
the same across shards, and there’s a beacon chain that can be used for coordination. In a sharded 
blockchain, however, all the shard chains are the same, while in the global blockchains ecosystem 
there are lots of different blockchains, with different target use cases, decentralization and privacy 
guarantees. 
Building a system in which a set of chains have different properties but use sufficiently 
similar consensus and block structure and have a common beacon chain could enable an ecosystem 
of heterogeneous blockchains that have a working interoperability subsystem. Such a system is 
unlikely to feature validator rotation, so some extra measures need to be taken to ensure security.  
 
3.3.2.2.2 Malicious Forks 
 
A set of malicious validators might attempt to create a fork. Note that it doesn’t matter if the 
underlying consensus is BFT or not, corrupting a sufficient number of validators will always make 
it possible to create a fork. 
It is significantly more likely for more than 50% of a single shard to be corrupted than for 
more than 50% of the entire network to be corrupted. As discussed above, cross-shard transactions 
involve certain state changes in multiple shards, and the corresponding blocks in such shards that 
apply such state changes must either be all finalized (i.e. appear in the selected chains on their 
corresponding shards), or all be orphaned (i.e. not appear in the selected chains on their 
corresponding shards). Since generally the probability of shards being corrupted is not negligible, 
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we can’t assume that the forks won’t happen even if a Byzantine consensus was reached among the 
shard validators, or many blocks were produced on top of the block with the state change. 
This problem has multiple solutions, the most common one being occasional cross-linking 
of the latest shard chain block to the beacon chain. The fork choice rule in the shard chains is then 
changed to always prefer the chain that is cross-linked and only apply the shard-specific fork-choice 
rule for blocks that were published since the last cross-link. 
 
3.3.2.2.3 Approving invalid blocks 
 
A set of validators might attempt to create a block that applies the state transition function 
incorrectly. For example, starting with a state in which Alice has 10 tokens and Bob has 0 tokens 
(see Figure 8), the block might contain a transaction that sends 10 tokens from Alice to Bob, but 
ends up with a state in which Alice has 0 tokens and Bob has 1000 tokens. 
 
Figure 8: Approving invalid blocks 
 
In a classic non-sharded blockchain such an attack is not possible since all the participant in the 
network validates all the blocks, and the block with such an invalid state transition will be rejected 
by both other block producers and the participants of the network that do not create blocks. Even 
if the malicious validators continue creating blocks on top of such an invalid block faster than 
36 
 
honest validators build the correct chain, thus having the chain with the invalid block being longer, 
it doesn’t matter, since every participant that is using the blockchain for any purpose validates all 
the blocks and discards all the blocks built on top of the invalid block. 
 
Figure 9: Malicious and honest validator behavior 
 
Figure 9 shows five validators, three of whom are malicious. They created an invalid block A’, and 
then continued building new blocks on top of it. Two honest validators discarded A’ as invalid and 
were building on top of the last valid block known to them, creating a fork. Since there are fewer 
validators in the honest fork, their chain is shorter. However, in the classic non-sharded blockchain, 
every participant that uses blockchain for any purpose is responsible for validating all the blocks 
they receive and recomputing the state. Thus, any person who has any interest in the blockchain 
would observe that A’ is invalid, and thus also immediately discard B’, C’ and D’, as such taking 
the chain A-B as the current longest valid chain. 
In a sharded blockchain, however, no participant can validate all the transactions on all the 
shards, so they need to have some way to confirm that at no point in the history of any shard of the 
blockchain no invalid block was included. 
Note that unlike with forks, cross-linking to the Beacon chain is not a sufficient solution, 
since the Beacon chain doesn’t have the capacity to validate the blocks. It can only validate that a 




3.3.3 RQ3: What are the problems associated with implementing First Layer scalability 
solutions in public blockchains? 
 
Since first-layer scaling solutions require a change in the codebase of an existing blockchain, these 
changes are incredibly difficult to implement in public permissionless blockchains such as 
Ethereum and Bitcoin. This problem arises because of the political decentralization nature of these 
blockchains. In order for such protocol changes, all the nodes on the blockchain network must agree 
on the change in protocol otherwise this change may create a hard-fork of the network which 
ultimately decreases its financial value. For instance, both Ethereum and Bitcoin suffered from 
hard-forks of their mainchain which led to the creation of Bitcoin Cash and Ethereum Classic. On 
the bright side, this difficulty in protocol change implementation on a public blockchain has given 
birth to in other innovative approaches of targeting blockchain scalability without changing the 
original codebase of such blockchains, but by implementing a second layer of blockchain on top of 
the mainchain. These solutions are known as second-layer scalability solutions and the most 
prominent of such proposals are the concept of sidechains, which are discussed in further detail in 
the next chapter.   
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As discussed in Chapter 3, the proposed first-layer scaling solutions (Bala & Manoharan, 2018), 
(Ehmke, Wessling, & Friedrich, 2018) require a change in the protocol of blockchains which is 
extremely difficult to implement, especially in public blockchains due to their decentralized nature. 
A change in protocol needs to be agreed upon by all the peers on the blockchain network otherwise 
it may result in a hard-fork which may ultimately, reduce its value. This makes it extremely difficult 
to test changes to a pre-existing blockchain protocol or to add new functionality to it. Additionally, 
there has been a huge surge in blockchain-based systems in the recent years, for instance, Bitcoin 
is primarily supports peer-to-peer payment network, Ethereum is used for the deployment of 
decentralized applications and Hyperledger Fabric (Androulaki et al., 2018) is used for the 
enhancement of supply-chains17. Thus, it is hard to envision a single blockchain ‘to rule them all’ 
for the future. It would be more worthwhile instead to make these disparate blockchains 
interoperable so, that they can communicate and interact with one another.   
In 2014, realizing this hindrance in the growth and further adoption of blockchains for 
building advanced, complicated and scalable software systems, Back et al. (Back et al., 2014) 
proposed a new and innovative method for improving the versatility and interoperability of 












Sidechains are secondary blockchains which are connected to other blockchains by means of a two-
way peg. A two-way peg is a mechanism that allows the bidirectional transfer of assets between 
the mainchain and the sidechain at a fixed or pre-deterministic exchange rate. Sidechains may have 
their own protocol and implementation which can be completely different from the main 
blockchain. Such adjustability provides the users flexibility to access various other functionalities 
and features offered on a sidechain by using the assets they already own on the main blockchain. 
Furthermore, sidechains are isolated from the main blockchain in such a way that in the case of a 
cryptographic break (or a maliciously designed sidechain), the damage is entirely confined to the 
sidechain itself.  
 Although promising, the sidechain technology is still relatively new and immature. There 
is a lack of comparative and empirical studies both in academic and industrial environments to 
analyze such multi-blockchain systems in a comprehensive manner. Hence, the motivation behind 
this chapter is to provide the first comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art sidechain platforms 
(which represent the most commonly used implementations of sidechain technology - hereafter 
referred to as sidechains) to understand the design choices, advancements, use cases, consensus 
mechanisms, asset transfer protocols and limitations of sidechains.  
 
 
4.2 Answers to Research Questions (RQs) 
 
 
In this section, we answer the research questions raised for second layer scaling solutions in Chapter 
2. We start the discussion by explaining what and how a two-way peg works, what are the available 
design choices, their advantages, and limitations. We will then look at four state-of-the-art 
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sidechain platforms namely Loom, POA, Liquid and RSK while discussing their use cases, 
consensus mechanisms, asset transfer protocols, and their limitations. 
 
4.2.1 RQ1: What are the available design choices for implementing two-way pegs? 
 
To understand the fundamentals and design choices for implementing a two-way peg enabled 
sidechain, we will discuss a trivial example in this section. Let us assume a sidechain is attached to 
a public and permissionless primary blockchain with a two-way peg. The primary blockchain: 1) 
operates a cryptocurrency called MainCoin and 2) cannot execute non-trivial smart contracts due 
to the absence of a Turing complete Virtual Machine. The sidechain: 1) operates its own 
cryptocurrency of named SideCoin, 2) has the capability of executing non-trivial smart contracts 
and 3) offers significantly higher transaction rate (i.e. higher transactions per second) than the 
mainchain. For the sake of simplicity in such multi-blockchain environment, the primary 
blockchain is called the parent blockchain (or mainchain) and the sidechain attached to it is called 
a secondary chain (the terms sidechain and secondary chains will be used interchangeably 
throughout the rest of this paper). In our example, a two-way peg allows the transfer of MainCoins 
from the mainchain to the sidechain and vice versa at a fixed rate of 1 MainCoin = 1 SideCoin. 
Suppose a user wishes to transfer 5 MainCoins from the mainchain to the sidechain to play a rock, 
paper and scissor game with another random user based on a smart contract (where winner takes 
all and a draw results in no exchange of coins) implemented on the sidechain, then this system 






Figure 10: Transfer of funds between mainchain and sidechain with a two-way peg 
 
1. The user sends 5 MainCoins to a special address (also known as a lock-box) where the 
coins are locked and can only be unlocked once funds on sidechain are locked and 
transferred back to the mainchain. 
2. Once the funds locked on the mainchain, 5 SideCoins are created on the sidechain. 
3. The user can now use these SideCoins to play the game of rock, paper, and scissors with 
another random user who is willing to bet the same amount of SideCoins. 
4. Depending on the outcome of the game, 10 SideCoins are transferred to the winner or 5 
SideCoins are transferred back to their respective owners (in case of a draw). 
5. The user(s) can then transfer their funds back to the mainchain, which essentially means 
that the SideCoins will be locked/destroyed on the sidechain and an equivalent number of 
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MainCoins will be unlocked on the mainchain from the lock-box (in step 1) after SideCoins 
are destroyed on the sidechain. 
The above steps are summarized in Figure 10 and can vary depending on the way in which 
a two-way peg has been implemented for the sidechain (sub-subsection 4.2.1.1). With this model, 
the total number of MainCoins in the mainchain ecosystem remains conserved whilst adding new 
functionality to it, i.e. execution of non-trivial smart contracts and faster transaction rates. 
Moreover, the implementation of these new features with sidechains do not require any major 
change in the core features or consensus protocol of the mainchain itself. 
Based on our analysis, there are currently three major design choices for implementing a 
two-way peg for transferring assets from the mainchain to the sidechain and vice versa. These 
design choices are discussed below. 
 
4.2.1.1 Centralized two-way pegs 
 
The simplest way to implement a two-way peg is to have a trusted third entity hold custody of the 
locked funds. In this design, the trusted entity is solely responsible for locking and unlocking of 
funds on both the mainchain and its sidechain. Figure 11 shows the relevant steps in which the 







Figure 11: Centralized two-way peg implementation 
 
Based on this two-way peg design, the steps for fund transfer (based on our example above) are 
modified in the following manner: 
1. The user sends 5 MainCoins to a lock-box address maintained by a trusted centralized 
entity meant for regulating fund transfer between the two blockchains. 
2. The trusted entity then generates 5 SideCoins on the sidechain and sends these funds to the 
user’s requested address. 
3. The user can now use these SideCoins to play the game of rock, paper, and scissors with 
another random user who is willing to bet the same amount of SideCoins. 
4. Depending on the outcome of the game, 10 SideCoins are transferred to the winner or 5 
SideCoins are transferred back to their respective owners (in case of a draw). 
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5. The user(s) can then transfer their funds back to the mainchain, by sending their SideCoins 
to the lock-box address on the sidechain which is also maintained by the same trusted 
central entity. The user(s) also specify the address where the funds need to be sent on the 
mainchain. 
6. The trusted central entity destroys the SideCoins on the sidechain and sends the equivalent 
number of MainCoins to address specified by the user(s). 
 
4.2.1.2 Multi-Signature or Federated two-way pegs 
 
An improvement over centralized two-way pegs are the federated two-way pegs (Back et al., 
2014), (Dilley et al., 2016). In such a design, a group of entities or notaries control the lock-box 
rather than just one central entity. Consequently, the entire federation or group collectively holds 
custody of the locked funds and regulates fund transfer between the primary blockchain and its 
sidechain. The fund transfer takes place only when the majority of the entities i.e. ‘n’ out of ‘m’ 
entities (where ‘n’ is the majority and ‘m’ is the total number of entities in the federation) within 
the Federation sign the transaction (Deng, Chen, Zeng, & Zhang, 2018). Figure 12 demonstrates 
the sequential steps with which fund transfer takes place between the two blockchains using a 




 Figure 12: Federated two-way peg implementation 
 
Based on a federated two-way peg design, the steps for fund transfer (based on our example 
above) are modified as follows: 
1. The user sends 5 MainCoins to a lock-box address maintained by a federation of entities 
meant for regulating fund transfer between the two blockchains. The entities of the 
federation then sign this transaction after verifying that the funds have been received in the 
lock-box. 
2. If the majority of the entities within the Federation sign the transaction, then the federation 
generates 5 SideCoins on the sidechain and sends these funds to the user’s requested 
address. 
3. The user can now use these SideCoins to play the game of rock, paper, and scissors with 
another random user who is willing to bet the same amount of SideCoins. 
4. Depending on the outcome of the game, 10 SideCoins are transferred to the winner or 5 
SideCoins are transferred back to their respective owners (in case of a draw). 
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5. The user(s) can then transfer their funds back to the mainchain, by sending their SideCoins 
to the lock-box address on the sidechain which is also maintained by the same federation 
of entities. The user(s) also specify the address where the funds need to be sent on the 
mainchain. 
6. The entities of the federation again sign the transaction after verifying that the funds have 
been received in the lock-box on the sidechain.  
7. If the majority of the entities sign the transaction, then the federation destroys the SideCoins 
on the sidechain and sends the equivalent number of MainCoins to address specified by the 
user(s). 
8. In the case when the majority of the entities within the federation do not reach an agreement 
regarding a transaction, then the funds are sent back to their respective owners on either 
chain. 
 
4.2.1.3 Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) 
 
Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) allows a lightweight 18  client to prove that a given 
transaction was included in a legitimate block of the longest Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchain, 
without having to download the entire chain from the genesis block itself. These lightweight (or 
SPV) clients are only required to download the block headers of the entire blockchain, which are 
much smaller in size than the actual block itself. To verify if a given transaction was included in a 
legitimate block, an SPV client requests a proof of inclusion, in the form of a Merkle branch of that 
transaction. Figure 13 demonstrates the entire process of transfer of funds from the mainchain to 
the sidechain and vice versa based on two-way peg implemented with SPV proofs. 
 






Figure 13: Two-way peg based on SPV proofs 
 
SPV proofs indirect proofs in the sense that a given transaction is not proven to be consistent with 
the entire blockchain from the genesis block itself. Instead, it is shown to be a part of valid block 
upon which miners have mined newer blocks, subsequently forming the longest chain. The way 






Figure 14: A block of transaction hash Merkle tree 
 
1. After a transaction is submitted for the transfer of funds from the mainchain to the sidechain 
or vice versa (i.e. the funds are locked in the lockbox), there is a confirmation period, which 
is strategically in place to allow miners to mine on top of the last block which consequently, 
allows the generation and submission of SPV proof. 
2. The SPV proof is then submitted by the user and the block in which his/her transaction is 
recorded is located. 
3. The user then provides the hashes along the Merkle tree branch on which his/her 
transaction lies. This is done in the following manner:   
a. Suppose a user is looking to validate Transaction 2 (Figure 14), he/she can obtain 
the hash of Transaction 1 and a combined hash of Transaction 3 and 4 i.e. 
Transaction (3, 4) from a number of other full nodes.  
b. With this information, the user can compute the root hash of the Merkle tree in the 
block.   
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4. If these hashes all collectively hash to the original Merkle root of the transaction hash tree 
in that block, then the transaction is valid. 
 
After an SPV proof is submitted there is a reorganization or reorg period in which other 
users may submit their own SPV proofs to contradict the user’s transaction. The SPV proof in 
which more blocks have been mined is considered to be the correct proof and decides the fate of 
the transaction. 
Given an SPV based two-way peg design, the steps for fund transfer (based on our 
example above) are modified as follows: 
1. The user sends 5 MainCoins to a lock-box address which is usually maintained by the 
miners of the network. Once the coins are locked on the mainchain, the user has to wait for 
a predetermined confirmation period to allow the mines to create new blocks to create SPV 
proofs. 
2. Once sufficient blocks are created by the miners, the user can submit an SPV proof 
verifying that the coins were locked on the mainchain. 
3. After the SPV proof is submitted, the user has to wait for the reorg-period where other 
users can submit their SPV proofs to nullify fraudulent transactions, in case one has taken 
place. 
4. After the SPV proof is verified 5 SideCoins are unlocked on the sidechain.  
5. The user can now use these SideCoins to play the game of rock, paper, and scissors with 
another random user who is willing to bet the same amount of SideCoins. 
6. Depending on the outcome of the game, 10 SideCoins are transferred to the winner or 5 
SideCoins are transferred back to their respective owners (in case of a draw). 
7. The user(s) can then transfer their funds back to the mainchain, by sending their SideCoins 
to the lock-box address on the sidechain and repeating the same process mentioned in steps 
1 – 4 on the sidechain side. 
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4.2.2 RQ2: What are the advantages and limitations of these design choices? 
 
The advantages and limitations of each of the design choices discussed in RQ1 are discussed 
below: 
4.2.2.1 Advantages of centralized two-way pegs 
 
There are two major advantages of using a centralized two-way peg design: 1) Centralized two-
way pegs are easy to visualize and implement due to their simplistic design which involves just 
one entity to oversee the transfer of assets between blockchains. 2) the design could provide 
extremely fast transfer of funds from the parent blockchain to its sidechain and vice versa as the 
central entity generally requires a simple proof of locked funds in the lockbox, which they can 
verify themselves at any given time. 
  
4.2.2.2 Disadvantages of centralized two-way pegs 
 
Using a trusted central entity comes with its own drawbacks, such as: 1) Public blockchains such 
as Bitcoin and Ethereum are designed to improve political decentralization and using such a two-
way peg design introduces a degree of political centralization as one has to trust a single entity to 
manage fund transfer from a primary blockchain to a sidechain and vice versa. 2) Using a 
centralized two-way peg design introduces a single point of failure in such multi-blockchain 
ecosystems as unforeseen circumstances such as power failures, hardware failures or natural 
disasters would temporarily or permanently cease asset transfers between the blockchains, which 
would cripple the sidechain network and 3) If the centralized entity is rogue or malicious, it can 




4.2.2.3 Advantages of federated two-way pegs  
 
The advantages of using a federated two-way peg design are: 1) It improves upon centralized two-
way peg design by improving the political decentralization of such multi-blockchain systems to 
some extent and 2) These designs could be implemented with specialized federation protocols for 
fast transfer of funds between the blockchains. Some of these protocols are Strong Federations 
(Dilley et al., 2016) (which is discussed further in RQ3c).  
 
4.2.2.4 Disadvantages of federated two-way pegs 
 
Federated two-way pegs can have drawbacks such as 1) Such design does not entirely eliminate 
the political centralization problem as this design still relies on a small group of entities to 
regulate and manage fund transfer between blockchains and 2) Funds in the lock-box could be 
stolen if the majority of the entities of a federation lose their private keys due to a malicious 
internet attack or social engineering. 
 
4.2.2.5 Advantages of SPV based two-way pegs 
 
The main advantage of an SPV based two-way peg is that it eliminates the third party required for 
fund transfer between two blockchains as in case of Centralized and Federated two-way pegs. 
 
4.2.2.6 Disadvantages of SPV based two-way pegs 
 
A disadvantage of an SPV based design is that these designs tend to be slow as a user needs to 









• Asset transfer between 
blockchains can be fast 
• Simple design and 
implementation 
• Politically centralized 
• Introduces a single point of 
failure 
• assets can be stolen by a 
malicious central entity  
Federated 
• Better political 
decentralization than 
centralized two-way pegs 
• Asset transfer between 
blockchains can be fast 
• Can work well with the 
right number and type of 
entities that form the 
federation (see Chapter 5) 
• Not politically decentralized 
• Assets can be stolen if private 
keys of the majority of entities 
are stolen 
SPV • Politically decentralized 
• Slow transfer of assets between 
blockchains 
 
Table 4 summarizes the Centralized, Federated and SPV based two-way peg designs based on their 
advantages and disadvantages. 
 
4.2.3 RQ3: Which state-of-the-art platforms are implementing sidechains? 
 
We will now discuss four major state-of-the-art sidechain platforms namely Loom (Loom, n.d.-b), 
(Loom, n.d.-a), Proof-of-Authority (POA) Network (Arasev, 2018), (POA, n.d.-b), Liquid (Dilley 
et al., 2016), (Blockstream, n.d.) and RootStock (RSK) (S. D. Lerner, 2015), (RSK, n.d.) 
 that improve scalability and facilitate interoperability in the multi-blockchain ecosystem. We chose 
these platforms based on the following reasons:  
• Popularity in the community: The popularity of a platform was determined by either one 
or both of the following criteria: 1) the number of users that are registered on the platform 
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(e.g. CryptoZombies19 a DApp on Loom has accumulated over 240,000 users since going 
live (Bentley, 2018)) and 2) partnership of the sidechain platform with prominent or well-
known blockchain companies or organizations (e.g. BitPay20 and BITMAIN21) (POA, n.d.-
c), (RootStock, n.d.), (O`KeeffeDaniel, 2018). 
• Availability of documentations, white papers, forums and technical support (Loom, n.d.-




Loom (Loom, n.d.-b), (Loom, n.d.-a) is a platform for running Decentralized Applications (DApps) 
and games on sidechains connected to the Ethereum Blockchain. It utilizes the Delegated Proof-of-
Stake (DPoS) protocol to reach consensus. Each DApp runs on its own sidechain (called a 
DAppChain) pegged to the Ethereum main-net. This allows the users and developers to run multiple 
nodes for an application on the sidechain. Along with the Delegated Proof-of-Stake consensus, 
Loom runs on a Byzantine-fault-tolerant state machine replication as a backend P2P layer called 
Tendermint22. In the Loom architecture, a transaction on the Loom network is not immediately 
settled on the Ethereum mainchain but instead, they are settled in bulk in order to increase 
scalability. 
 
4.2.3.2 POA Network 
 
The POA network (Arasev, 2018), (POA, n.d.-b) is an open-source public Ethereum sidechain for 
developing smart contracts. It uses Proof of Authority (POA, 2017) as its consensus protocol. The 
platform provides the users and developers of smart contracts and decentralized applications with 







the flexibility to develop on Ethereum standards with more scalability and interoperability between 
other blockchain networks.  
POA network supports native Solidity (“Solidity,” n.d.) smart contracts, which allows 
effortless portability of smart contracts and decentralized applications from the Ethereum 
environment to the POA network. The platform charges minimal transaction fees which combined 
with about four magnitudes in transaction speed over Ethereum encourages and promotes the 
development of scalable games and applications. Additionally, POA provides bridging (especially 
for ERC-721 tokens) capabilities which allows users to transfer their non-fungible tokens from one 




Liquid (Dilley et al., 2016), (Blockstream, n.d.) is a commercial sidechain by Blockstream. It 
enables instantaneous movement of funds between exchanges, without waiting for the delay of 
confirmation in the Bitcoin blockchain. The transactions on the Liquid platform are completed in 
an average of two minutes. Liquid supports private transactions which allow traders and exchanges 
to trade/transact in private, preventing front-running of large orders.  
Liquid also supports Issued assets where an organization or a company that serves as the 
custodian of assets (physical or cryptocurrency), can issue a tokenized version of the asset using 
the platform. Once the assets are tokenized on the Liquid platform, they can be traded freely within 
the network, taking advantage of Liquid’s speed and private trading features. The Liquid Network 
consists of a ‘Strong Federation’ (Dilley et al., 2016) (discussed in RQ3c) which consists of several 
financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges who all run high-performance computing 




4.2.3.4 RootStock (RSK) 
 
RSK (S. D. Lerner, 2015), (RSK, n.d.) is an open-source sidechain pegged to the Bitcoin main-net 
for the execution of smart contracts, it is an evolution of QixCoin (“Qixcoin,” n.d.), a Turing-
complete cryptocurrency developed in 2013. RSK implements the concept of merged mining (S. 
Lerner, 2016) which provides incentives to the miners of the Bitcoin blockchain to be actively 
involved by mining on RSK platform.  
RSK incorporates a Turing complete, resource-accounted, and deterministic virtual 
machine (called the RootStock Virtual Machine or RVM) for the parallel execution of smart 
contracts in the Bitcoin ecosystem by several nodes. The execution of smart contracts can result in 
the processing of messages between multiple other smart contracts, creation of new transactions or 
change of a state of smart contract’s persistent memory. RVM is compatible with Ethereum’s 
Virtual Machine (EVM) at op-code level which allows the execution of Solidity (“Solidity,” n.d.) 
smart contracts on RSK.  
 
4.2.4 RQ3a: What are the use cases of these platforms? 
 
The use cases of each platform are now discussed to answer this research question: 
4.2.4.1 Loom Use Cases 
 
The Loom network has mainly been used for the following use cases: 
• Digital Social Interaction: The original use case of the Loom Network is DelegateCall23 
which is a forum where questions can be asked and each answer that a user provides and 
upvotes earns them ‘Karma’. Karma can be traded on the Ethereum chain for ERC-20 




tokens. ERC-20 tokens are fungible tokens, or coins, on the Ethereum Network which are 
not unique and can be divided into smaller portions.   
• Game development: The second use case for the Loom Network is for running games 
such as games built on Unity24. Games require quick transaction times and the performance 
of the mainchain is much faster than it would be if the games were run on the Ethereum 
blockchain itself. The gas fees required for the transactions on the Loom sidechain are 
much less than on the Ethereum chain making it more practical for game development. 
 
4.2.4.2 POA Use cases  
 
The purpose of the POA network is to prove the possibility of cross-chain transfers between an 
Ethereum chain and a sidechain. Interoperability is a major goal of the POA Network along with 
an increase in scalability and the connectivity of Ethereum. POA aims to have a solution to 
communicating between two stand-alone blockchains. Some of the major projects that have used 
the POA network as of November 2018 are as follows: 
• Swarm City25, a decentralized commerce platform, has used the ERC20 to ERC20 bridge 
to transfer tokens from the Ethereum chain to Kovan test-net26 
• Sentinel Chain (Lai, 2018) is transferring ERC20 tokens from the Sentinel Chain to other 
EVM-based blockchains. 
• Virtue Poker 27  has used the POA bridge along with their own sidechain to eliminate 
expensive transactions. 
• Colu Network28 has partnered with the POA network to connect their own sidechain. 








• POA network is additionally working with more projects to help deal with the scalability 
and high gas cost of the Ethereum network. 
 
4.2.4.3 Liquid Use cases 
 
Since, strong federations were designed to provide solutions to problems related to transaction 
latency, commercial privacy, reliability and fungibility, the most prominent use case of the Liquid 
platform is in international exchange: 
• International Exchange: Bitcoin can facilitate cross border payments and remittance, but 
it is limited by its own design choice that hampers its performance (Karame, Androulaki, 
& Capkun, 2012). It also suffers the wrath of market-dynamics like most if not all 
cryptocurrencies at this time. Consequently, the high latency of the Bitcoin network 
requires Bitcoin to be tied up in multiple exchanges and brokerage environments. The lack 
of privacy also adds to its cost of operation. Additionally, local currency trade with Bitcoin 
can be a subject to illiquidity due to market fragmentation because of which many 
organizations and commercial entities choose to operate or design their own high-
frequency methods of exchange (Moore & Christin, 2013). These solutions and 
workarounds have often introduced in centralized systems and other issues (Karame et al., 
2012). Thus, with strong federations, Liquid, introduces improved security and privacy, 
with lower latency than the Bitcoin network. 
 
4.2.4.4 RSK Use cases 
 
The compatibility of RVM with EVM opens the door up for the implementation of several 
innovative smart contracts and use cases as it allows the developers working on the Ethereum 
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platform to take advantage of Bitcoin’s robustness. Some of the most important use cases are 
discussed below: 
• Retail Payment Systems: With the implementation of RSK, Bitcoin could be adopted 
globally for day-to-day retail transactions. In its current state, it is not feasible to use 
Bitcoins in retail due to its slow confirmation time (~ 10 minutes – 1 hour to ensure 
irreversibility). RSK can allow consumers to have the security of Bitcoin with faster 
transaction times (~ 10 seconds). This would allow merchants to accept payments faster 
without having to rely on third-party gateways. Additionally, the RSK platform can handle 
a high volume of transactions per second (~ 300 - 1000 transactions per second) which is 
yet another necessity for a payment processing platform to succeed in the retail industry.  
• Supply Chain Traceability: With RSK smart contracts could be implemented to track and 
trace the physical location and condition of a product. Such contracts could be particularly 
useful in food, retail, healthcare, and transportation industries. Once again, such contracts 
would be backed by the security and robustness of the Bitcoin protocol. 
• Digital Identity: Developing countries struggle with the lack of documentation and 
identification for the poor, which can prevent them from voting, accessing healthcare and 
financial aid, reporting criminal activities. Hence, with RSK digital global registries could 
be implemented at extremely low costs, this could be a major step in the improvement of 
the overall infrastructure of such countries. 
 
4.2.5 RQ3b: How does asset transfer take place on these platforms? 
 





4.2.5.1 Asset transfers on the Loom Platform 
 
The Loom network has plans to allow for ERC721 and ERC20 tokens to be transferred from the 
Ethereum blockchain to the DAppChain and vice-versa using Plasma-based relays 29 . At the 
moment, Loom only allows for ERC721 tokens to be traded on the network. ERC721 tokens are 
non-fungible tokens meaning that they can be collected, and each individual token is unique and 
irreplaceable. Currently, Loom uses a Transfer Gateway to support the transfer of these tokens. 
When the tokens are being deposited to the DAppChain, the tokens are sent to a gateway contract 
before being sent to the Gateway Oracle where the transfer is forwarded to the Gateway Contract 





Figure 15: Asset transfer from Ethereum to DAppChain 





The Gateway Oracle typically runs on nodes that are serving as delegators for the Delegated Proof 
of Stake consensus algorithms although a gateway oracle can run on nodes that are standalone. If 
the tokens are being withdrawn from the DAppChain back to the Ethereum mainchain, the tokens 
are sent back to the Transfer Gateway Oracle where the user submits a Merkle proof of the user’s 
transaction history and the withdrawal awaits a signature of approval. With this signed withdrawal 
record, the user may withdraw tokens back to the Ethereum mainchain. Figure 16 shows the asset 




Figure 16: Asset transfer from Ethereum to DAppChain 
 
The mainchain gateway contract needs to approve of the signature produced by the Gateway 
Oracle. When a user initially deposits tokens to the DAppChain from the mainchain, an address 
mapper contract creates a mapping of both the private key for Ethereum and the private key for the 
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DAppChain. The reason that a signature is not required for depositing to the sidechain but is 
required for withdrawing back to the mainchain is that the signature is used to decrease the 
dependence on the personalized consensus algorithm being used on the sidechain when in need of 
transferring. The Ethereum mainchain, on the other hand, has a more trusted consensus algorithm. 
 
4.2.5.2 Asset transfers on the POA network 
 
There are three different types of transfers that can take place. 
• Native to ERC20: In this case, “Native” refers to the POA tokens. POA tokens are locked 
in a smart contract and POA20 tokens are then generated on the Ethereum blockchain. The 
POA20 tokens are the POA equivalent of the ERC20 tokens that are found on the Ethereum 
blockchain. These tokens are burned on the Ethereum blockchain before the smart contract 
is activated and the tokens are unlocked on the POA blockchain. 
• ERC20 to ERC20: Token “X” from the first Ethereum network is locked on the first 
Ethereum Network. Token “Y” is generated on the second Ethereum network and then 
burned on the second network. The smart contract is activated, and the Token “X” is 
unlocked on the primary Ethereum network.  The difference between this bridge and the 
first Native to ERC20 bridge is instead of the bridge only supporting the transfer of tokens 
to and from the POA network this bridge allows for the transfer of tokens between any two 
networks operating on the Ethereum chain. 
• ERC20 to Native: The ERC-20 to Native bridge allows for the transfer of DAI tokens 
from the Ethereum Network to the xDAI chain. The DAI token is an ERC-20 token that 
maintains a 1:1 ratio with the United States Dollar (USD) meaning that each DAI token is 
always worth exactly one US dollar. The xDAI chain is an Ethereum based blockchain 
using the USD-stable XDAI token. DAI tokens differ from XDAI tokens by the fact that 
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DAI tokens live on the Ethereum mainchain whereas the XDAI tokens live on a separate 
xDAI sidechain. It also maintains a ratio of 1:1 with the US Dollar and is backed by 
Ethereum collateral. XDAI tokens are minted on the xDAI chain network and burned on 
the xDAI chain network. The Smart Contract is activated, and the DAI tokens are unlocked 
on the Ethereum network. A subset of the total number of validators function as validators 
for each set of bridge transactions. Also, each bridge is bilaterally allowing for a transfer 
back and forth between two blockchains. The transfers happen within one’s own wallet by 
having representations of tokens on one network be minted on the other network. 
 
4.2.5.3 Asset transfers on the Liquid Platform 
 
Native Assets: The Liquid network supports accounting of other assets (including traditional 
currencies, real-world assets, and other cryptocurrencies) in addition to Bitcoin. These are known 
as native assets and are accounted separately from the base Bitcoin cryptocurrency. These assets 
can be issued by any participant by means of a special asset-generating transaction. They can also 
optionally set conditions by which additional issuance can take place in the future:  
• A policy for an asset being generated is decided upon by the asset issuer, which includes 
conditions for asset redemption.  
• The asset issuer creates a transaction with one or more special asset-generating inputs, 
whose value is the full issuance of the asset. This transaction uniquely identifies the asset.  
• A member of the strong federation confirms the asset-generating transaction after which 
the assets become transactable.  
• The asset issuer then distributes these assets to its user-base as per requirement. This is 
done by using standard strong federation transactions.  
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• When the users wish to redeem their asset tokens, they transfer their asset holdings back to 
the issuer in return for out-of-band goods or the provided service. The issuer then destroys 
these tokens. 
 
Peg-out Authorization: When Bitcoins are frozen on the Bitcoin blockchain and pegged into the 
Liquid network they become Liquid Bitcoin (L-BTC). The L-BTCs can be then utilized on the 
Liquid network and can be transferred back to the Bitcoin blockchain at any given time. As 
discussed earlier, moving assets back to the Bitcoin blockchain is foreseen and mediated by a set 
of watchmen, who create the transactions on the Bitcoin side. These transactions take place with 
the help of peg-out authorization proofs which have the following design:  
• Setup: Each participant i chooses two public-private keypairs: (Pi, pi) and (Qi , qi), where 
pi is an “online key” and qi is an “offline key”. The participant then provides Pi and Qi to 
the watchmen. 
• Authorization: To authorize a key W (which will correspond to an individually-controlled 
Bitcoin address), a participant takes the following steps.  
➢ They compute Lj = Pj + H(W + Qj )(W + Qj ) for every other participant index j, 
where H is a random oracle hash that maps group elements to scalars.  
➢ The participant knows the discrete logarithm of Li, and can, therefore, produce a 
ring signature over every Li. They do so by signing the full list of online and offline 
keys as well as W.  
➢ The participant sends the resulting ring signature to the watchmen or embeds it in 
the sidechain.  
• Transfer: When the watchmen produce a transaction to execute transfers from the 
sidechain to Bitcoin, they ensure that every output of the transaction either 1) is owned by 
them or 2) has an authorization proof associated to its address.  
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4.2.5.4 Asset transfers on the RSK Platform 
 
Asset transfers on RSK take place with federated two-way pegs. When Bitcoins are transferred 
from the Bitcoin blockchain to the RSK sidechain they are referred to as “SmartBitcoins” (SBTC) 
(S. D. Lerner, 2015). Hence, SmartBitcoins are Bitcoins living natively on the RSK platform, they 
can be transferred back to the Bitcoin blockchain at any given time for a standard RSK transaction 
fee. 
The federation that controls the asset transfers on RSK comprises of well-known and 
community respected members/entities. Each entity of the federation is identified by a public key 
for the checkpoint signature scheme. An entity can be added or removed from the federation by 
means of an embedded predefined voting system. The addition/removal of an entity from the 
federation requires a high majority of votes. 
The RSK platform aims to maximize the incentives for merged-mining. However, RSK is 
not completely dependent on merged-mining as it is robust to merge-mining shortages. In case of 
such situations, the federation automatically takes charge of the RSK network to keep it secure. 
 
4.2.6 RQ3c: What consensus mechanism do these platforms utilize? 
 
We now discuss the consensus mechanisms utilized by the platforms discussed in RQ3 to answer 
this research question: 
4.2.6.1 Loom Consensus Mechanism 
 
Loom allows for any consensus mechanism to be implemented on a personalized DApp chain, 
although the Loom SDK provides support for DPoS on a shared sidechain. In Delegated Proof of 
Stake, witnesses are elected who propose blocks and verify transactions. These witnesses serve a 
fixed term before elections take place again. Each voter is required to register with the account’s 
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public address and the power of each vote is proportional to the number of tokens that account 
holds. Accounts are permitted in DPoS to proxy their votes to trusted third parties who vote with 
power proportional to proxy balance + sum (balance of principles). 
 
4.2.6.2 POA Consensus Mechanism 
 
The POA network takes advantage of Proof of Authority consensus mechanism. The validators 
make all of the governance decisions through exclusive Distributed Applications. US public 
notaries serve as the validators on the network. The validators must be publicly known individuals 
whose participation can be easily reviewed adding a layer known as an Identity at Stake model30. 
The POA network rewards validators based on the amount staked. Currently, there are a total of 23 
validators throughout the United States. 
 
4.2.6.3 Liquid Consensus Mechanism 
 
Dilley et al. (Dilley et al., 2016) recognized both, the latency issues with using a Proof-of-work 
consensus mechanism and using a centralized system. Inspired by that, the authors decided to 
implement Liquid in a manner that would allow users to transfer assets between blockchains by 
providing explicit Proof-of-Possession (PoP) within transactions. Building up on the idea of 
federated two-way peg design introduced by Back et al (Back et al., 2014), the authors have 
introduced the concept of Strong Federations (Dilley et al., 2016). Strong Federations are made up 
of two types of independent entities, namely: 
• Block-signers: maintain the blockchain consensus and to advance the sidechain. They sign 
transaction blocks on the sidechain. 




• Watchmen: are responsible for transferring assets from the sidechain to the mainchain by 
signing transactions on the mainchain. Thus, they are only required to be online when 
assets are beings transferred between the blockchain. 
In a Strong Federation, entities that form the federation cannot directly control a user’s 
assets on the system other than their own. In such systems, just the knowledge of a private key is 
enough to practice the right to spend and hence, no intervention of a third party is required. Strong 
federations also have a mechanism that allows settlements to be transferred back to the mainchain 
in case of a federation failure. 
Liquid replaces dynamic miner (such as in Bitcoin) with a fixed signer set for a federation 
to have low latency and eliminate the risk of reorganization from a given hostile minority. It 
implements a validation of a script (which can be static or can change subject to fixed rules) instead 
of a Proof-of-Work consensus protocol similar to private chains (Friedenbach & Timón, 2013). In 
federated two-way pegged chains, as discussed in RQ1, the script implements a ‘n’ of ‘m’ multi-
signature scheme which requires each block to be signed by a predetermined number of 
signers/entities (for instance ‘n’ of ‘m’ signers/entities). As a result, this mechanism can achieve 
Bitcoin like Byzantine robustness as a minority of malicious entities would not be able to affect the 






Figure 17: Block-signing by entities on the Liquid platform 
 
Figure 17 can be summarized in the following steps: 
• Entities propose candidate blocks in a round-robin fashion to all other signing participants.  
• Each entity signals its intent by pre-committing to sign the given candidate block.  
• If threshold X is met, each entity signs the block.  
• If threshold Y (which may be different from X) is met, the block is accepted and sent to 
the network.  




In Bitcoin, there is a tendency for chain reorganization in the newly added blocks due to 
the probabilistic generation of blocks (Eyal & Sirer, 2018). Since block generation in case of strong 
federations are based on a fixed set of block signers instead of being probabilistic, Liquid chain 
never reorganizes. This allows significantly faster transaction confirmation times than Bitcoin. 
 
4.2.6.4 RSK Consensus Mechanism 
 
While mining on the Bitcoin blockchain, conflicting situations may arise when multiple miners 
solve a block at the same chain height. In such situations, it becomes hard to decide which miner’s 
block to select and add to the network. Additionally, miners are often required to stop mid-state 
and restart mining on new blocks each time a new block is solved and added to the network. These 
situations result in poor mining efficiency, greater network latencies, and mining time gaps. 
To mitigate this RSK utilizes DECOR+ (S. D. Lerner, 2015) protocol, a reward sharing 
scheme which reduces competition while mining providing miners with the option to switch to the 
newest block later. With DECOR+ conflicts are resolved deterministically when all nodes have the 
same blockchain state information, the resolution is chosen in such a way that it maximizes the 
revenue for all miners involved whether they were involved in the conflict or not. The protocol has 
the following main features: 
• If a miner switches each time a new block is accepted to the RSK network, they compete 
for a full block reward.  
• If a miner switches late i.e. they keep mining older blocks, they create uncles31 and earn a 
share of the block reward.   
 




In neither of these situation blocks are fully orphaned32, as the DECOR+ protocol pays a 
reward to uncles, which are counted as normal blocks (GHOST protocol (Sompolinsky & Zohar, 
2016)). This greatly increases the efficiency of mining on RSK. 
When the RSK hashing power is below 50% of the total Bitcoin hashing power, the 
network could be vulnerable to 51% attacks and double spending problems. To prevent such 
situations, RSK utilizes federated checkpoints, which are signed by federation entities and can be 
used by a client to decide which is the best block with the help of multi-signature majority. 
Moreover, if the total RSK hashing power goes below 5% of the total Bitcoin hashing power, the 
federation would be able to create signed blocks. Finally, the clients stop using federated 
checkpoints by defaults if the total RSK hashing power is over 66% of the Bitcoin hashing power 
and the paid fees in a block is higher than or equal to the average reward of a Bitcoin block. 
 
4.2.7 RQ3d: How do these platforms impact the scalability of their mainchain? 
 
Table 5 provides a comparison of Ethereum, Loom network and the POA network based on average 
block confirmation time, transaction rate, smart contract execution capability, security guarantee 
and if the transactions are confidential. 
As it can be seen form Table 5, the similarities between the mainchain i.e. Ethereum and 
its sidechain are that all the platform support smart contract execution and none of them support 
private transactions. The table also shows that the loom network has the fastest block confirmation 
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Yes Yes Yes 
Security guarantee Staking Validators + Voters Validators 
Confidential 
transactions 
No No No 
 
Table 6 summarizes the key differences between Bitcoin, Liquid and RSK based on average block 
confirmation time, transaction rate, smart contract execution capability, security guarantee and if 
the transactions are confidential. 
 






















No No Yes 
Security guarantee SHA256D miners Strong federation 
SHA256D merger 
miners + federation 
Confidential 
transactions 
No Yes Planned for future 
 








It is clear from Table 6 that only RSK supports the execution of smart contracts. It also has the 
fastest block confirmation times and highest transaction rates compared to the Bitcoin (mainchain) 
blockchain or the Liquid network.  
 
4.2.8 RQ3e: What are the limitations of these platforms? 
 
To answer this research question and to conclude the set of research questions discussing second 
layer scaling solution, we now discuss some of the limitations of state-of-the-art platforms 
discussed in RQ3. 
 
4.2.8.1 Limitations of Loom 
 
Some of the limitations of the Loom network are as follows: 
• The entire transaction history of the sidechain is stored on the Ethereum mainchain instead 
of the sidechain itself decreasing the data integrity of the sidechain. The Merkle roots of 
the entire transaction history of the sidechain is periodically updated on the mainchain 
leaving open opportunities for an attack in between updates of the sidechain’s transaction 
history (Bharel, 2019). 
• To further increase the reliability on the mainchain, the security guarantees of the Loom 
network hinge on the ability to transfer tokens back to the mainchain. If the tokens are not 
approved for transfer back to the mainchain, the tokens can be at risk of being 
compromised. Loom’s security is based on the mainchain being the target of an attack and 
not the sidechain a game is running on. There is more incentive in putting forth the 
resources to take over the Ethereum mainchain then a DApp supporting a decentralized 
game. Loom uses Plasma to securely transfer tokens back to the mainchain without needing 
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to trust the consensus algorithm on the sidechain. In a plasma exit, this is where a Merkle 
proof needs to be presented and can be challenged and the exit can fail. 
• Another limitation of the Loom network is being restricted to OS X and Linux operating 
systems. The closest support for Windows is the Windows subsystem for Linux. Also, 
Loom’s transfer gateway functionality can hurt the performance of the transfer of tokens 
between the two blockchains. The transfer gateway depends on an active presence on the 
Loom network and if there is not one, the transfer of tokens will be delayed. 
• Loom network is based on federated two-way pegs, which introduce centralization in its 
blockchain-sidechain ecosystem as discussed in RQ1. 
 
4.2.8.2 Limitations of POA 
 
Some of the limitations of the POA network are as follows: 
• POA network suffers from the problem of centralization due to the power that the 23 
validators hold. The governance of the network is entirely determined by these validators. 
These validators reside solely in the United States and are public notaries of the United 
States. They are chosen by individual qualities such as public reputation, personal 
knowledge, and experience. They also need to be diverse geographically within the United 
States, so validators come from different states. One of the restrictions on adding to the 
number of validators is finding potential validators that meet the needed qualifications.  
• Since all the validators of the POA network are based in the United States, this introduces 
geographical centralization element in the network. This type of model is undesirable as 
the validators may choose to censor information from other regions or countries. 
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• The POA Network plans on an increase in validators but there is worry that an increase in 
the number of validators will impede the performance of the network as it would take a 
longer time for block-signatures and hence, transaction confirmations. 
 
4.2.8.3 Limitations of Liquid 
 
Some of the limitations of the Liquid platform are as follows: 
• Currently, only members of the Liquid network can run full nodes. Although the developers 
plan to allow other users to run full nodes to validate the network, it is not feasible at its 
current state.  
• Liquid nodes require more computing resources than Bitcoin as the platform requires a 
Bitcoin node alongside the Liquid node to be able to validate asset transfers. 
• The liquid network uses federated two-way pegs which introduces political centralization 
in the sidechain ecosystem. 
 
4.2.8.4 Limitations of RSK 
 
Some of the limitations of the RSK platforms are as follows: 
• Currently, the RSK main-net is not available to all developers. The platform currently 
employs a whitelisting process where a development team/company is required to have a 
fully functional/semi-functional project approved by RSK to gain access to the network for 
testing and deployment on the platform. The whitelisting process can take a minimum of 3 
days for approval. The platform aims to open the network for all users once the first stage 
of the bounty hunting program is completed. 
• The use of federated two-way pegs introduces political centralization in the sidechain 




4.2.8.5 Comparison of Sidechain Platforms 
 
Table 7 provides a comparative summary of Loom, the POA Network, Liquid and RSK platforms 
based on possible use cases, consensus mechanism, two-way peg design and limitations. The table 
also highlights the advantages that these platforms provide over their parent chains. 
Table 7: Comparison of sidechain platforms 





























1. limited Windows (OS) 
support 
2. If the tokens are not 
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the mainchain, the tokens can 
be at risk of being compromised 
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4. Centralization due to 
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2. Running Liquid full nodes 
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running Bitcoin full nodes 
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An interesting observation from Table 7 suggests that all the four platforms discussed in this section 
use federated two-way pegs. This is because in its current state it is not possible to implement SPV 
based two-way pegs in Bitcoin, due to missing opcodes from its protocol (See Chapter 5 – sub-
section 5.2.3). Whereas, when it comes to the Ethereum based sidechain platforms, the Loom 
network intends to implement a more robust, secure and decentralized two-way peg design in the 
future and finally, the POA network’s decision to implement a federated two-way peg was based 
on the idea of preservation of a human element in a blockchain ecosystem. 
 
4.3 Other projects and frameworks 
 
There are other innovative sidechain projects and frameworks that slightly fell short of our criteria 
for selection. The reasons why these projects were not selected were because of incomplete and/or 
active development, technical difficulties and lack of thorough documentation and support. 
Plasma is a framework proposed by Buterin and Poon (Buterin & Poon, n.d.), which may 
have the potential to provide highly scalable solutions for the blockchain-based decentralized 
financial industry as it incentivizes and enforces the execution of smart contracts. The platform is 
potentially aiming to achieve more than a billion state updates per second. The smart contracts 
running on the platform are incentivized to continue operation autonomously with the help of 
network transaction fees. This process ultimately relies on the underlying blockchain (for instance, 
Ethereum) to enforce transactional state transitions. 
The Elements project (BlockStream, n.d.) was launched in June 2015. It is an open-source, 
blockchain platform which is also sidechain-capable. It provides features such as Issued assets and 
confidential transactions. Blockchains developed with the Elements platform can be configured 
and developed to either run as standalone blockchains or as pegged sidechains to other blockchains 
which allow assets to be transferred between disparate blockchains. It utilizes and extends the 
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current Bitcoin codebase; hence, it allows developers to take advantage of the bitcoind 38 
Application Programming Interface (API) to develop blockchains and test proof-of-concept 
projects. Since Elements is built upon the Bitcoin’s codebase, it can also serve as a test-net for 
introducing changes to the Bitcoin protocol. 
In the context of the Elements platform, a sidechain is an extension to an existing 
blockchain. Assets are transferable between chains allowing the main chain to benefit from the 
enhanced features of the sidechain, such as rapid transfer finality and confidential transactions. 
While a sidechain is aware of the main chain and its transaction history, the main chain has no 
awareness of the sidechain, and none is required for its operation. This enables sidechains to 
innovate without restriction or the delays associated with main chain protocol improvement 
proposals. Indeed, rather than trying to alter it directly, extending the main protocol with a sidechain 
allows the main chain itself to remain secure and specialized, underpinning the smooth operation 












Both first- and second-layer scaling solutions are innovative approaches for improving the 
scalability of public and permissionless blockchains. But based on our research, they require 
extensive further research for the advancement of the blockchain domain, this is because in their 
current state these solutions face multiple issues which need to be addressed. In this chapter, we 
will discuss some of the major issues surrounding the proposed first- and second-layer scaling 




5.1 First-layer scaling solutions 
 
First-layer scaling such as segregated witness and sharding face multiple implementation threats 
and challenges such as threats of a hard fork, miner incentivization, extreme physical resource 
requirement, etc. In this section, we will discuss some of the issues that the blockchain community 
faces when it comes to implementing first-layer scaling solutions.  
 
5.1.1 Data Validation in Sharding 
 
Consider Figure 18 on which Shard 1 is corrupted and a malicious actor produces invalid block B. 
Suppose in this block B 1000 tokens were minted out of thin air on Alice’s account. The malicious 
actor then produces valid block C (in a sense that the transactions in C are applied correctly) on top 
of B, obfuscating the invalid block B, and initiates a cross-shard transaction to Shard 2 that transfers 
those 1000 tokens to Bob’s account. From this moment the improperly created tokens reside on an 
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otherwise completely valid blockchain in Shard 2. A few simple approaches to tackle this issue 
could be: 
 
Figure 18: Data validation problem in sharding 
 
• For validators of Shard 2 to validate the block from which the transaction is initiated. This 
won’t work even in the example above since block C appears to be completely valid. 
• For validators in Shard 2 to validate some large number of blocks preceding the block from 
which the transaction is initiated. Naturally, for any number of blocks N validated by the 
receiving shard, the malicious validators can create N+1 valid blocks on top of the invalid 
block they produced (Skidanov, 2018c). 
A promising idea to resolve this issue would be to arrange shards into an undirected graph 
in which each shard is connected to several other shards and only allow cross-shard transactions 
between neighboring shards (Skidanov, 2018c). If a cross-shard transaction is needed between 
shards that are not neighbors, such transaction is routed through multiple shards (Skidanov, 2018a), 
(Martino, Quaintance, & Popejoy, n.d.). In this design, a validator in each shard is expected to 
validate both all the blocks in their shard as well as all the blocks in all the neighboring shards. 
79 
 
Consider Figure 19 below with 10 shards, each having four neighbors, and no two shards requiring 




Figure 19: Cross-shard transactions amongst neighboring shards 
 
Shard 2 is not only validating its own blockchain, but also blockchains of all the neighbors, 
including Shard 1. So, if a malicious actor on Shard 1 is attempting to create an invalid block B, 
then build block C on top of it and initiate a cross-shard transaction, such cross-shard transaction 
will not go through since Shard 2 will have validated the entire history of Shard 1 which will cause 





Figure 20: An adversary executing cross-shard transaction 
 
While corrupting a single shard is no longer a viable attack, corrupting a few shards remains a 
problem. Figure 20 shows an adversary corrupting both Shard 1 and Shard 2 successfully executes 
a cross-shard transaction to Shard 3 with funds from an invalid block B: Shard 3 validates all the 








The idea behind solving the data validation problem in blockchain sharding is shown in Figure 21: 
whenever a block header is communicating between chains for any purpose (such as cross-linking 
to the beacon chain, or a cross-shard transaction), there’d a period during which any honest 
validator can provide a proof that the block is invalid.  
There are various constructions that enable very succinct proofs that the blocks are invalid, 
so the communication overhead for the receiving nodes is much smaller than that of receiving a 
full block. With this approach for as long as there’s at least one honest validator in the shard, the 
system would be secure. 
 
5.1.2 A threat of hard forks 
 
We have emphasized a major problem with the implementation of first-layer scaling solutions on 
public and permissionless blockchains (Chapter 3 - RQ3) i.e. the agreement within the miners 
regrading a specific change in the protocol of the blockchain. There will often be times when a 
proposed change in protocol for a blockchain will not be agreed upon by the majority of the miners 
of the blockchain network. This leads to a difficult situation in which forcing a change in the 
protocol of the blockchain is likely to cause a hard fork of the network as can be seen in the case 
of Bitcoin forking into Bitcoin Cash. Thus, this makes public and permissionless blockchains such 
as Bitcoin and Ethereum extremely stringent and deterrent to change, even when the change is for 
the overall improvement of the blockchain network. This aspect of a public blockchain is a major 
limitation and a huge stumbling block in the implementation of first-layer scaling solutions.  
 Often times lack of proper communication amongst the miners of a blockchain regarding 
a proposed change in protocol might also result in change resistance. Although there are protocols 
available for proposing changes to the Ethereum and Bitcoin protocol such as, Ethereum 
Improvement Proposals (EIP) (Ethereum, n.d.) and Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIP) (Bitcoin, 
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2011), these proposals are hardly ever advertised to the blockchain community especially the 
miners of these networks (Khatwani, 2017). Hence, we suggest a lightweight broadcasting and 
voting system for clearly describing and advertising the proposed changes, their advantages and 
limitations to the miners of a blockchain network. The system can then be used for conducting polls 
within the miners on whether a change in the protocol should be implemented or not. This would 
be an effective way of conveying or advertising a change in protocol for a public blockchain 
amongst its miners instead of directly forcing a change which may result in a hard-fork or just 




5.2 Second-layer scaling solutions 
 
Sidechains are still relatively new proposals and are by no means mature enough to change the 
blockchain world at this time, but they sure are promising for the future of the blockchain industry. 
In this section, we discuss the most important open issues in the infant sidechain domain and 
suggest future measures and recommendations for the mitigation or elimination of these issues. 
 
5.2.1 Centralization in federated two-way pegs 
 
Political decentralization is an important characteristic of a blockchain network, as discussed in 
Chapter 4 – RQ1, federated two-way pegs introduce a level of political centralization in the 
sidechain ecosystem. Hence, it is important to identify and select honest and trusted entities to form 
a federation for the security and integrity of a network.  It is extremely critical that entities have 
their economic interests well aligned with the proper functioning of a federation. It would obviously 
be a mistake to rely on a random assortment of volunteers to support a commercial sidechain 
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holding significant value. Beyond the incentive (R M Parizi & Dehghantanha, 2018) to attempt to 
extract any value contained on the sidechain, these volunteers would also have little incentive to 
ensure the reliability of the network. To mitigate these concerns, we propose a federation should at 
least have the following attributes which may potentially lead to good results: 
• Federations are most secure when each entity has a similar amount of value held by the 
federation. Incentives can be aligned using escrow, entity allocation, or external legal 
constructs such as insurance policies and surety bonds 
• The total number of entities that form a federation should lie in the range - [15, 30]. This 
is to maintain political decentralization and still provide the users with the ability to verify 
the authenticity of each entity within the federation in a relatively short period of time. 
• The identity and authenticity of each entity should be verifiable. Some ways to achieve this 
could be providing proof of identity with government issued ID’s or licenses, proof of 
physical address, etc. 
• Entities should be distributed geographically to prevent down-time in case of power failure, 
natural disasters, etc. 
• Entities should be disparate from one another and should not engage in business with one 
another, this would eliminate conflict of interest and censorship. 
 
5.2.2 Security of Federated two-way pegs 
 
Federated two-way pegs introduce a security risk in the sidechain ecosystem. For instance, if the 
private keys of the majority of the network are compromised, then the assets locked in the lockbox 
(or on the sidechain) are vulnerable to theft. This is because as discussed in Chapter 4 – RQ1, a 
transaction in a federated two-way peg design requires ‘n’ of ‘m’ signatures to be approved (where 
‘n’ is the majority in a total of ‘m’ entities). One way to mitigate this threat would be to migrate to 
84 
 
SPV based two-way peg design where the lockbox is usually controlled by the miners of the 
network and the only way to unlock the funds from the lockbox is to provide a valid SPV proof.  
 
5.2.3 SPV based two-way pegs on Bitcoin 
 
SPV proofs can provide a solution to the political centralization issue with federated two-way pegs. 
As discussed in Chapter 4 – RQ1, SPV proofs require no single entity or a group of entities 
(Federation), for transferring assets from the mainchain to the sidechain and vice versa. 
Unfortunately, SPV based two-pegs cannot be implemented on a sidechain pegged to the Bitcoin 
blockchain at this time. This is because in its current state Bitcoin is missing a few opcodes from 
its protocol such as:  
• OP_WITHDRAWPROOFVERIFY: OP_WITHDRAWPROOFVERIFY would unlock 
‘reserve’ coins on a sidechain. A user would need to provide inputs to an output such that 
the output would evaluate to true - which would unlock the reserve coins. The user would 
then be credited on the sidechain with the amount of coins they locked up on the Bitcoin 
blockchain. The change on the sidechain would also be sent back to the federation’s reserve 
address (Stewert, 2017). 
• OP_REORGPROOFVERIFY: OP_REORGPROOFVERIFY would allow users to 
submit SPV proofs in the reorg-period (Chapter 4 – RQ1). This opcode would correct 
invalid states of two types: 1) double spends (Bala & Manoharan, 2018), (Bae & Lim, 
2018) of a parent chain lock and 2) parent chain reorganizations (Elements, 2016).  
We propose the addition of these opcodes to the Bitcoin protocol in the future. This would 
allow the community to implement sidechain technology with SPV based two-way pegs instead of 




5.2.4 Lack of research support on current sidechain platforms 
 
The sidechain domain is still relatively new and hence, most state-of-the-art sidechain platforms 
are still in development or bounty hunting phases. Based on the authors’ experimental experiences, 
registering or submitting DApps on some the platforms (e.g. Liquid and RSK) discussed in the 
previous chapter is extremely difficult and selective as the developers do not provide access to all 
users on their platforms at this time. To make matters worse some of these platforms are not 
integrated to the Bitcoin or Ethereum test-nets at this time (e.g. Liquid). This makes performing 
empirical studies by researchers or practitioners on these platforms extremely difficult and 
expensive due to the market value of Bitcoin and Ether cryptocurrencies. Empirical research is an 
important tool in software engineering (Malhotra, 2015) which can reveal hidden trends, patterns, 
anomalies and limitations of a software system (Reza M Parizi, Dehghantanha, Choo, & Singh, 
2018). Hence, we strongly advocate the integration of these platforms to their parent chain’s test-
nets. This would allow the researchers in the community to analyze and evaluate these platforms 
based on several attributes such as performance, security, and privacy which would help in 











In the last decade, blockchain technology has grown exponentially with seemingly new use cases 
being discovered almost every day. Consequently, research in the domain has picked up pace in 
recent years both to discover issues and vulnerabilities in blockchains and to provide solutions to 
these problems and challenges. Scalability and limited functionality have shackled blockchains 
ever since its proposal and implementation in 2008. In response to this, the community has 
proposed first- and second-layer scaling solutions. 
First layer scaling solutions require changes in the codebase of existing blockchains. We 
have discussed two of the most common first layer scaling solutions i.e. Segregated witness and 
sharding. Second layer scaling solutions do not require changes to existing blockchain codebase, 
instead, these solutions propose an implementation of a second layer on top of existing blockchains, 
for instance, sidechains.  
Although these solutions are promising, a comprehensive study is still lacking in the 
literature to study the impact of scaling solutions on the scalability of public blockchains such as 
Bitcoin and Ethereum. Moreover, there has been a lack of studies discussion on how and where 
these solutions can be effectively integrated into blockchains to remedy current issues in a clear 
context. Hence, the motivation of our study was to take the first step and provide a comprehensive 
review of 1) the available design choices for the first layer scaling solutions for public blockchains, 
and 2) state-of-the-art sidechain platforms based on their use cases, consensus mechanisms, asset 
transfer protocols, and limitations. This thesis also identifies current advancements, analyzes their 
impact from various viewpoints and proposes directions for the future of research and development, 
Moreover, we have discussed general open issues that need well-deserved attention from the 
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